Supreme Court, SS.UU., the order June 13, 2006 No 13659 -
Done
1. CA offers for instance the rules of jurisdiction over a case pending before the Court of Florence (Rg No 4464/03), initiated against the University of Pisa and FE citation of May 3, 2003, for sentencing of the defendants, jointly and severally, to recover damages from the unlawful exclusion from the course cagionatigli PhD. The petitioner, said that the defendants had challenged the ordinary jurisdiction, requests that the Joint Sections of the Supreme Court declare the competent ordinary courts.
2. C. Reports that, after participating in the contest held by the University of Pisa, had been admitted to the course to obtain the Ph.D. in history, international relations and institutions of countries outside Europe, lecturer and tutor prof. EF. During the course, after the first year, prof. F. had, given the behavior of opposition and obstruction of his research, culminating in the presentation of a report on the act of student life "deliberately as unfairly negative." By Decree of the Rector of December 12, 1999, No 01/1607, had been ordered his esclusane the continuation of the course based on the report of Professor. F., approved by the faculty.
3. Made a counterclaim FE, and has not worked as the University of resistance, with the written submissions the prosecution asked the court to declare the administrative judge awarded damages consequential since the scope of the administrative jurisdiction of the court by the Legislative Decree no. March 30, 2001, No 165, Art. 63, paragraph 4. They have submitted statements
C. and F..
Law
1. The Court, in sections joined together, in part differences by the public prosecutor, the rule in the sense that belongs to the knowledge of the administrative court proceedings brought against the University of Pisa, to the knowledge of the ordinary court proceedings brought against the prof. EF.
2. It should be said that, in this case, it is relevant to the scope given to the administrative jurisdiction of the Decree. March 30, 2001, No 165, Art. 63, paragraph 4, relating to disputes concerning bankruptcy procedures for the recruitment of employees of public administrations. The Ph.D., as regulated by Presidential Decree 11 July 1980, No 382 (Reorganisation of university teaching, related training organizational as well as testing and teaching) - and subsequent amendments - is that degree shall be obtained following a preordained course to develop their own scientific research capabilities, through which highlight creative originality and methodological rigor (and, in fact, its exams are designed to ascertain the candidate's aptitude for scientific research: the same Presidential Decree No. 382 of 1980, Art. 71, paragraph 4). Admission to the course, therefore, does not create an employment relationship, nor has the nature of remuneration any scholarship awarded to the student.
3. The harmful effects are connected by C. is how to manage the course and, in particular, Decree rettoriale exclusion.
Under the provisions of Presidential Decree 382 of 1980, Art. 68, in force at the material time (the article was repealed by L. July 3, 1998, No. 210, Art. 6, with effect from the year following the entry into force of the Ministerial Decree referred to ' art. 4, paragraph 2 of that Act - DM April 30, 1999, No. 224 -), the title of Doctor of Philosophy is awarded as a result of conducting research, post-graduation degree, who have given place, with original contributions to knowledge in one or interdisciplinary fields, the same provision specifies the contents of studies, provides, at the end of each year, the submission of detailed report on the activities and research at the faculty, provides, finally, that the assessment of sustained and hard work can lead to propose the exclusion from the rector of the PhD research.
You can not, therefore, to doubt the existence of a case of carrying out activities authoritative of university administration, as admission to the course, the checks and controls on process, the exclusion from it. The claim, therefore, was given against malicious use of the administrative function, or, as we said, in relation to the mode of organization, direction and control of the course (you See the numerous unlawful charged to tutor, prof. F.), and, especially, with regard to the issue of exclusion from the course.
4. Belonging to the administrative jurisdiction of legitimacy (which is configured also in matters of exclusive jurisdiction) of the control on the determination of university administration in order to doctoral courses, is derived from certain attribution of "powers" to the administration, discretionary or even bound - as rooted opinions on technical and scientific expressions of appreciation cd. technique - as the rules exclude definitely the configurability of the student claims protected by the consistency of the subjective right As for the performance of courses and graduation.
5. The sections are called together to decide on the issue of jurisdiction in civil liability related to activities of pa provvedimentale. The argument, from Leg. March 31, 1998, No 80, gave rise, as is known, for a broad debate in doctrine and in jurisprudence, especially after the decisions of partial unconstitutionality handed down by courts of law in the judgments July 6, 2004, No 204 and July 28, 2004, No 281, the exclusive jurisdiction of administrative courts in relation to L. July 21, 2000, No 205 ("Provisions on administrative justice") decisions to which it is Recently added to the sentence May 3, 2006, No 191, which was declared illegal in part the Leg. June 8, 2001, No 327, Art. 53, paragraph 1 ("Consolidation Act of laws on eminent domain").
However, there are two aspects of this issue, where sections are joined calls to be answered: how, after the L. 205, 2000, shall be apportioned between the ordinary courts and the administrative court, judicial review brought to enforce the responsibility of the PA provvedimentale unlawful activities, if the party can be limited to seeking compensation for damages, without having to even ask for the cancellation and which regime is such a different form of judicial protection, once we admit it.
And, for a correct formulation of the problem - both on changes in the division of jurisdiction between the ordinary courts and administrative courts, intervened in the years 1992-2000, both on the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the Decree. March 31, 1998, n . 80, art. 33, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Art. 34, paragraph 1, as a novel by L. July 21, 2000, No 205, Art. 7 - should take its starting point the reasoning of the Constitutional Court, ruling in 204, on the preparation of the Constitution.
6. At that time, as noted by the Court, reaffirmed "the essential absorption in the Constitution of the fundamental principles of Law of 20 March 1865 n. 2248, all. E", ispirati al principio dell'unità della giurisdizione, ma vi emerse il contrasto tra la tesi - perdente - a favore del giudice unico ("l'esercizio del potere giudiziario in materia civile, penale e amministrativa appartiene esclusivamente ai giudici ordinari") e quella vincente, per il mantenimento di giudici diversi da quelli ordinaria quali Consiglio di Stato e Corte dei conti ("una divisione dei vari ordini di giudici ... ognuno dei quali fa parte a sè"). La regola tradizionale del riparto della giurisdizione - se si tratta di diritti soggettivi la giurisdizione è del giudice ordinario, se è fatto valere un interesse legittimo la giurisdizione appartiene al giudice amministrativo - trova il proprio antecedente storico and logical in L. March 20, 1865, No 2248, all. E, Art. 2 and 4, still in force. If the law is equal for everyone, including the AR, a citizen who has suffered injury to his right may apply to the ordinary court and the court will only know the harmful effects of the administrative act, without reviewing the current discretion, completely independent of pa. The law of 1865 makes it the principle of unity of jurisdiction, but this rule will prove to be unsuitable to provide adequate protection to the citizen, is the large amount of claims that the law abolitio of litigation reserved to the administrative authority, thus removing it to judicial review, both a timidity of the ordinary courts in applying the principles laid down by Law 1865, Annex E. E 'in this situation that, in 1889, there is the choice for the introduction of the administrative review of acts by an advisory body, the Council of State, the judicial nature of which is then explicitly stated by Law No 642 of 1907 establishing the 5th Section of the State Council. The area of \u200b\u200bprotection before a judge situations is thus expanded.
The structure thus created is confirmed by the RD June 26, 1924, No 1054, (Council of State). This arrangement is not engraved on the other hand by the introduction of "exclusive jurisdiction".
Jurisdiction Rights shall be referred to the Council of State in specific cases, confirming the general rule at the base of the division.
This is an exclusive jurisdiction, objectively different, then, from that intended by the legislature in recent years.
limited to a few "borderline cases", its introduction is explained by the difficulty of distinguishing in the tangled interplay between subjective rights and legitimate interests, even if its introduction was to indicate a clear recovery of the logic of administrative disputes abolished in 1865.
Such is the structure crystallized in the Constitution of 1948, art. 24 by recognizing substantial protection both that the legitimate interest of the individual right and as art. Cpc 103, subsection 1, limiting the jurisdiction of administrative courts in matters of rights subject to "particular matters" specified in the Act, art. 113 cpc, defers to state law the court may annul the administrative act and the consequences of.
This arrangement continues to be reflected in subsequent legislation, until Leg. March 31, 1998, No 80.
Indeed, as the nine "special" cases identified in the RD 30 September 1923, No 2840, Art. 8 (RD reaffirmed in the June 26, 1924, No. 1054, Law No. 1034 of 1971, Art. 29 and 7) as in those subsequently introduced (among others: L. No 1185, 1967, Art. 11; L. No 10 of 1977, Art. 16; L. No 47, 1985, Art. 35; L. No 210, 1985, Art. 11; L. No 241 of 1990, Art. 11:15; L. No 287 of 1990, Art. 33, paragraph 1., Legislative Decree no. 74, 1992, Art. 7, para 11; L. No 109 of 1994, Art. 4, paragraph 7; L. No 481 of 1995, Art. 2, paragraph 25; L. No 249 of 1997, Art. 1, paragraph 26), have always remained confidential to the ordinary courts on questions concerning rights related to consequential damages, including damages.
But it is worth noticing is that the regulatory framework in this case has developed over time, and consistently applied the principles of the legitimate dell'irrisarcibilità, degradation of the law with interest and administrative INTERFERENCE. So that is not without reason, if the regulatory framework and the baggage of the concepts that served to give an explanation, will require changes, once established himself, with the Legislative Decree no. 80, 1998, contrary to the legitimate rule of Recoverability.
7. Taking a step back and returning to the division of jurisdictions, it must be said that the debate was open, not so much on the location of the allotment consistam, no longer contested, as the exact identification of the respective territories, the rights and interests, who did not live in separate worlds, as one and the others scattered throughout the relationship between private and pa, wandering da un rapporto di coesistenza ad uno di successione, in situazioni dal confine incerto, a volte dubbio, di "facile trapasso" (Cass., sez. un., 5 dicembre 1987 n. 9095 e 9096).
Il sistema - al di là di qualche decisione provocatoria della Cassazione, rimasta isolata (Cass., sez. 1^, 3 maggio 1996 n. 4083), o di eccezioni di incostituzionalità, poi disattese (Corte Cost., 8 maggio 1998 n. 165) - è durato dal 1865 fino al 1992 (un periodo lungo ben 127 anni).
A metterlo in crisi sono stati i principi comunitari in tema di appalti pubblici di lavori o forniture.
L'introduzione di una fattispecie di risarcibilità degli interessi legittimi lesi, in violazione del diritto comunitario, comes to light with the L. February 19, 1992, No 142, Art. 13 (Community Law, 1991).
In implementing the EC Council Directive No. 665/89 of 21 December 1989, was recognized in the award of public contracts, the ability to produce, after the annulment of the prejudices on the part of the administrative court, the damages from the ordinary courts.
However, the route to go soon became particularly heavy, because it forces the individual to bring proceedings before the administrative judge to cancel and then the ordinary courts for damages, thus putting into question the principle of effectiveness of judicial protection enshrined in Article. 24 of the Constitution.
The Italian legislature in the first instance, the rule also extended to the markets of the excluded sectors (L. 19 December 1992, n. 489, art. 11) and then to service contracts (L. 22 February 1994, No 146, Art. 11, points. i): Community Law for 1993) but, to deny the overwhelming value on the previous allotment, it was decided to consider "a rule of business and not of general application" (Court of Cassation, sez. a ., April 20, 1994 No 3732). Hence, a decided change of course with the deletion of the call of L. No 142, 1992, Art. 13 contained in L. February 11, 1994, No 109, Art. 32, paragraph 3, the effect of the story introduced by the DL April 3, 1995, No 101, converted with amendments into Law June 2, 1995, No 216. The "revolutionary provision" has finally been expressly repealed by Legislative Decree no. 80, 1998, Art. 35, uc (now Law No. 205 of 2000, art. 7, uc), along with "any other rules should be devolved to an ordinary judge of disputes on compensation of the annulment of administrative acts."
We can therefore say, first, that the provision introduced by L. No 142, 1992, he helped to dismantle the old system oriented to avoid damages to the legitimate injury, and secondly that his half were asked the premises because the Constitutional Court has been led to recognize in the concentration of safeguards before the same court for a full implementation of art. 24 of the Constitution.
8. E 'in the framework described so far that the legislature of the century brings a new kind of exclusive jurisdiction, separate from the jurisdiction of legitimacy, and also anchored in "sectors" of public policy, with a significant presence of public interest.
The government with the Legislative Decree no. 80, 1998 - well beyond the limits of the authority granted by Law March 15, 1997, No 59, Art. 11, paragraph 4, letter. g) - and, after the declaration of unconstitutionality (Constitutional Court July 17, 2000, No 292), the Parliament with the L. No 205, 2000, attach the "special areas" of contracts and public services and building e urbanistica ad una "nuova" giurisdizione esclusiva del giudice amministrativo, estesa anche ai diritti patrimoniali consequenziali e al risarcimento del danno.
Il legislatore, inoltre, estende la nuova giurisdizione non solo alle vecchie ipotesi di "servizi pubblici, edilizia ed urbanistica", ma a qualsiasi fattispecie di giurisdizione esclusiva vecchia o nuova.
Si porta a compimento l'indirizzo che vede nella giurisdizione esclusiva "il ramo più fertile e cioè più proiettato nel futuro della giurisdizione amministrativa". Nel contempo, la risarcibilità dell'interesse legittimo, già prevista dal D.Lgs. n. 80 del 1998 (ma ricondotta dalle sentenze della Corte Costituzionale n. 292 del 2000 e n. 281 2004, within the limits of the authority granted by Law No 59 of 1997) is extended to the whole field of legal justice before an administrative court.
9. In conclusion, the law has now accepted the principle of Recoverability of the legitimate interests of the injury as a result of the illegality of the administrative act, by providing - in the implementation of the concentration rule - that the administrative law judge may hear and determine all matters relating to 'compensation for any damage and place.
10. The fabric is the basis of the regulatory approach to adopt can be summarized as follows.
The Legislative Decree no. 80, 1998, Art. 35, as substituted by L. No 205, 2000, art. 7, letter c) in paragraph 1 states that "The administrative court in proceedings devoted to its exclusive jurisdiction, has, through the re-integration in a specific form, the claim for damages." The article mentioned in paragraph 4 (replacing the first sentence of the Law No. 1034 of 1971, Art. 7, paragraph 3) provides that "The Regional Administrative Court, within its jurisdiction, he also knows all the issues for the possible damages, including reinstatement specific performance, and other consequential economic rights. " In turn, paragraph 2 regulates the procedures for determining the sum due, stating that ".. The administrative judge may determine the criteria under which the government or the operator of the public service must propose OF THE PRODUCER title for the payment of a sum within a reasonable period. If the parties fail to reach an agreement with the remedy provided by the Act approved by Royal Decree 26 June 1924, No 1054, Art. 27, paragraph 1, number 4), may be made for the determination of the amount due. "
11. The declaration of unconstitutionality of the legislation has not hit just remembered, has been about the L. No 205, 2000, art. 7 for exclusion from the non-exclusive jurisdiction of disputes ", which they may be entirely absent from every point of view due alla pubblica amministrazione - autorità", con il ritorno alla dicotomia "diritti soggettivi - interessi legittimi", ripudiando il diverso criterio dei "blocchi di materie" che mirava a trasformare il giudice amministrativo nel "giudice dell'amministrazione".
Si afferma in proposito che la giurisdizione esclusiva introdotta dalla L. n. 205 del 2000 appare configgere con i parametri costituzionali ed è qualitativamente diversa dalla precedente, che riguardava specifiche controversie "connotate non già da una generica rilevanza pubblicistica, bensì dall'intreccio di situazioni soggettive qualificabili come interessi legittimi e come diritti soggettivi". Si precisa che l'adozione, da parte del legislatore del 1998-2000, di un'idea di giurisdizione esclusiva, ancorata alla pura e semplice presenza, in un certo settore dell'ordinamento, di un rilevante pubblico interesse, avrebbe presupposto la modifica dell'art. 103 Cost., mai approvata, nel senso che "la giurisdizione amministrativa ha ad oggetto le controversie con la pubblica amministrazione nelle materie indicate dalla legge" (Atto Camera 7465, 13^ Legislatura). Viceversa, il vigente art. 103 Cost., comma 1 "non ha conferito al legislatore ordinario una assoluta ed incondizionata discrezionalità nell'attribuzione al giudice amministrativo di materie devolute alla sua giurisdizione esclusiva, ma gli ha conferito il potere di indicare particolari materie, nelle quali, la tutela nei confronti della pubblica Administration also involves individual rights. "The connection of the" issues "submission to the exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative law judge with the subjective nature of the situations is expressed by art. 103 of the Constitution provides that where those materials must be" special "than those already devolved the general jurisdiction of legitimacy, where pa is acting as an authority against which protection is afforded to the citizen before the administrative courts.
In conclusion, the legislator may well widen the area of \u200b\u200bexclusive jurisdiction, but in relation to " particular matters "where the natural jurisdiction attracts the interest and knowledge of the competing interests closely connected. This implies that the mere participation of the pa trial is not sufficient to ground the jurisdiction of administrative courts - "who really would take the form of court" of the "public administration in violation of Article. 25 of the Constitution and Art. 102 Cost ., paragraph 2 "- and, moreover, is not sufficient" the involvement of general public interest in the dispute because it can be referred to the administrative judge. " They are therefore excluded from the unifying function of the Supreme Court rulings that the only invest the subjective rights in respect of which, in accordance with the "particularity" of matter in the sense explained above, the legislator was entitled to provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative courts on the rights and interests, as well as those involving the forms of protection afforded to the administrative court considers legitimate.
12. You return to the consequences, from previous statements of principle, the Court has drawn about the way in which the legislature has set up exclusive jurisdiction of the matters outlined in Legislative Decree no. 80, 1998, Art. 33 and 34 modified by Law No 205 of 2000: a point on which the Court is still focused in sentence # 191 of 2006 about the role that in the area of \u200b\u200bexpropriation, taking behaviors aimed at the early execution of works, still declared of public utility, 13. Here's interesting to dwell on the point that the declaration of unconstitutionality did not invest the provisions contained in Legislative Decree no. 80, Art. 35 as redrafted by L. No 205, 2000, art. 7, read. c).
The Court noted that "the power given to the administrative courts have, through the re-integration in a specific form, the claim for damages is not new in some respects a matter assigned to its jurisdiction, but a means of further protection, against traditional demolition (and / or compliance), to be used to bring justice to the citizen against the government. "
On this part of the grounds of the 204, the Court is back in Case No. 191 this year.
has specifically held that it is possible that for that reason alone that the claim made by the citizen has the sole object damages, jurisdiction rests with the ordinary courts "and noted that where" the law - as does the Leg. No. 80 of 1998, Art. 35 - building damages for the purposes of allocation of jurisdiction between the ordinary courts and administrative courts as a means of asserting protection - as has been said - the character "rimediale" it does not violate any constitutional precept and, indeed, is implementing the content of Article. 24 of the Constitution if this requires that the judicial protection to be effective and is made within a reasonable time. "In other words" - the Court noted - "the previous system that, given the inherent nature of subjective right of the legal situation resulting from the annulment of an administrative measure, attributed to the ordinary court disputes over compensation consequential to the annulment of administrative acts (as the Legislative Decree no. 80, 1998, Art. 35, paragraph 5, as amended by Law No. 205 of 2000, art. 7, read. c)) the legislature replaced (just under art. 35 cit.) a system that recognizes only the natural judge of the legality of the exercise of civil powers such as to ensure full protection, and therefore also the power to compensate both is equivalent to specific performance, the damage suffered by the unlawful exercise of their functions ".
14. The long process to reconstruct the path so far has earned another law to make intelligible what we should now consider the point 'arrival in the search for the solution marked the beginning of the first aspect, ie on what basis is now established to be distributed among the jurisdictions.
emphasize in this end, two moments in particular and the subjective circumstances of the city considered in its static aspect and the effects that the legislation relates administrative action once it is exercised. The judicial protection against unlawful act the government is for the ordinary courts, how many times the right of the individual can not stand compression due to a power exercised in an unlawful manner or, if born, how many times the action of the government are not in compliance with a previous exercise of power, which is recognizable as such because, in turn, acted in the manner and in the presence of the requirements for claim as an act or measure, and not merely because of the fact. To this end, we believe that should be referred to the principle of law stated by the Constitutional Court in Case No. 204, 2000, that the jurisdiction of administrative courts is in any case bounded by concrete in connection with the exercise of administrative power according to the procedures laid down by typical: it is the exclusive jurisdiction in that jurisdiction for annulment.
That does not occur when the administration acts on an equal footing with private parties, or when the transactions of the public is attributable to a mere material, with the knowledge that concerns in this area all the time ' exercise of power is not even recognizable as the indirect influence of the story. Exemplifying
, the administration needs to be sued in the ordinary courts in all cases in the pound claimant constitutes a reaction to the injury of rights incompressible, such as health (Cass. February 7 1997 No 1187; 8 August 1995 8681, July 29, 1995 No 8300, No 20 November 1992 12386, October 6, 1979 No 5172) or personal integrity.
has yet to be sued in the ordinary courts, how many times the damage of the assets of the private and the indirect effect of the unlawful use or failure of powers, ordered the protection of private (Cass. July 29, 2005 No 15916, May 2 2003 No. 6719):
in dispute here is merely for damages already covered in Legislative Decree no. 80, 1998, Art. 33, paragraph 2, as amended prior to the reformulation attuatane with the ruling 204 of 2004, which forecast is no longer necessary, in so far as in them is to discover, in general, the reaction to mere conduct prejudicial to the administration.
In the area of \u200b\u200billegal occupations, are also clearly attributable to the ordinary jurisdiction forms of employment "pirated", characterized by sudden, irreversible transformation of the fund that is produced in a situation where a declaration of public utility is missing at all.
And we must reach the same conclusion in the case where the expropriation order has been issued yet, and yet in relation to goods, of which, by the public utility should now say never happened legally or failed to initial failure occurred or the expiry of his term of effectiveness. Where
hand la situazione soggettiva, nei termini che si sono indicati, si presenta come interesse legittimo, la tutela risarcitoria ne va chiesta al giudice amministrativo.
Conviene a tale riguardo soffermarsi su alcune fattispecie la cui classificazione ha sin qui dato luogo a discussione ed il cui tratto peculiare si rinviene nella circostanza che oggetto della domanda non è l'annullamento di un atto, ma appunto solo il risarcimento del danno.
Riconducigli alla giurisdizione del giudice amministrativo appaiono i casi in cui la lesione di una situazione soggettiva dell'interessato è postulata come conseguenza d'un comportamento inerte, si tratti di ritardo nell'emissione di un provvedimento risultato favorevole o di silenzio.
Ciò che viene qui in rilievo è bensì un comportamento, ma il comportamento si risolve nella violazione di una norma che regola il procedimento ordinato all'esercizio del potere e perciò nella lesione di una situazione di interesse legittimo pretensivo ( Ad. pl. 15 settembre 2005, n. 7). non di un diritto soggettivo. Presenta analogie con questa situazione, quella valutata dalla Corte costituzionale nella sua più recente decisione, dove parimenti l'accesso al giudice amministrativo non è segnato da una domanda di annullamento, ma si considera che ad attrarre la fattispecie nell'orbita della sua giurisdizione possa valere la presenza di un concreto riconoscibile atto di esercizio del potere: quel potere, in particolare, che si è manifestato in the declaration of public utility.
15. - It remains to deal with what at first it is useful as a second problematic aspect of public protection in the face provvedimentale unlawful activity of public administration, namely the possibility of asking the only claim for redress.
Since he took into consideration a compensable injury has a legitimate interest, it became the topic if the private individual can claim for the right to limit or prejudice the interest-only compensation claims and what may be the treatment the case of this application.
16. Until the most recent ruling by the Constitutional Court, they had only come about hermeneutical two positions in stark contrast to each other.
According to a first, widespread opinion, "all administrative, Legislative Decree no. 80, 1998 and L. No 205 of 2000 would be attributed, in general, the administrative judge of the knowledge claims for damages from unlawful acts of the PA, within the exclusive jurisdiction (pursuant to art. 35, paragraph 1) or legality (under paragraph 4), which both have now taken on the connotation of jurisdiction "full".
Thus it appeared to direct the State Council, that the ratio of the reform initiated by the Legislative Decree no. 80 of 1998 and completed by Law No 205 of 2000 was to concentrate before a single judge, the administrative, consistent with art. 24 of the Constitution, any form of protection, including damages, against the PA, comes into play when the damage to legitimate interests (cons. State, sec. 6 ^, 18 June 2002 No 3338, Ad. Plen. March 26, 2003 4; For plen. August 30, 2005 No. 8).
In particular, some decisions (For plen. 4 of 2003) have embraced the argument that the provisions referred to would have expected, as a necessary condition for access to compensation claims, which the limitation period for the appeal was also experienced favorable results with the action for annulment, even if the claim for redress can be sought not together, but later.
Ciò in ragione del principio della cd. pregiudiziale amministrativa.
L'annullamento avrebbe dovuto essere richiesto in via principale nel termine di decadenza, perchè al giudice amministrativo non è consentita la cognizione incidentale della illegittimità degli atti amministrativi nè esso è munito del potere di disapplicazione.
Consegue che, se la tutela di annullamento non è richiesta nel termine per l'impugnazione del provvedimento, questo diviene inoppugnabile, precludendo l'accesso non solo alla tutela risarcitoria erogabile dal giudice amministrativo, ma anche a quella che potesse essere chiesta al giudice ordinario, facendo valere l'atto illegittimo come elemento costitutivo dell'illecito civile (As sent. 500 of the 1999 SU).
The Council of State had indeed accepted that the claimant could be granted in certain cases before the administrative court as an independent application (cons. State, sec. 6 ^, 18 June 2002 No 3338).
And this, as well as in cases of damage caused by delay in those where the annulment of the measure has already been there, by the same administrative judge (for example, in a period when the administrative jurisdiction was not a court " full ") or as a result of an administrative or annulment on or cancellation of a special office.
scenario I have outlined, the jurisdiction of the administrative judge on pretese risarcitorie del cittadino che si assume leso in una posizione giuridica sostanziale (di diritto o di interesse legittimo) dall'esercizio illegittimo della funzione amministrativa non dovrebbe concorrere con una, sia pur residuale, giurisdizione del giudice ordinario. Ovvio che il giudice amministrativo, nato come giudice dell'atto e non del rapporto, avrà non poche difficoltà a distinguere il danno specie sotto il profilo della determinazione del quantum del danno risarcibile: dovrà mutuare le regole civilistiche sul concetto stesso di danno come fatto, sul nesso di causalità, anche ipotetico (si pensi all'art. 1221 c.c.), sui criteri di valutazione ex art. 1223, 1225, 1226 c.c., art. 1227 c.c., comma 1 (concorso di cause) and paragraph 2 (damage avoided with due diligence).
A different reconstruction, "all civil," is alleged by some writers, building on the principles established by the sent. 500 of 1999 of UP.
starting point is its classification as a right of claim for damages, both to the private and the AR, in a view that denies the relevance to subsequent regulatory action, which could not scratch, merely by connecting the case, the protection recognized the fundamental personal right, against any party operated.
It is motivated by the consideration that, according to the Constitutional Court, "the power given to the administrative judge have, through their reintegration into specific form, the claim for damages is not in any way a new "material" given its jurisdiction, but a means of protection further than the classic demolition (and / or compliance), be used to bring justice to the citizens against the PA. "
The connection profile of the case did not exclude, however, that the protection is preparing a position substantially the nature of an individual right: the right to claim for damages.
The harm, as determined by the infringement of a legal interest (whether right or legitimate interest: sent. 500 1999), would give rise to an obligation of compensation (ex art. 2043 cc or art. 1218 cc according to the possible change in attitude of responsibility for the pa), while the party seeking compensation for actions always a subjective right. The sentence No 204 of 2004 of the Constitutional Court would, therefore, only denied that the new Article. 35 has created a new exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative court concerning the right to compensation.
The important point in the decision of the Court, would be where it was found that the allocation of further instrument of compensation claims, came in addition to the classic protection of cancellation, was rewarded with a set la giurisdizione del giudice amministrativo, in attuazione del precetto dell'art. 24 Cost., come giurisdizione atta a garantire piena ed effettiva tutela alle situazioni soggettive ad essa devolute, per evitare al cittadino di doversi rivolgere a due diversi ordini di giudici, cioè a quello amministrativo per conseguire prima l'annullamento e poi a quello ordinario per ottenere il risarcimento del danno, come diritto patrimoniale consequenziale.
E' stato messo in dubbio che la Corte abbia inteso riferirsi soltanto alla giurisdizione esclusiva (art. 35, comma 1), ovvero anche a quella generale di legittimità (art. 35, comma 4), ma si è considerato corretto attribuire ampia valenza alla ravvisata estensione dei poteri del g.a. in both jurisdictions, which are then characterized by fullness.
The Court did, however, in no way express the nature of the damages.
If, therefore, held firm to qualify for the right to claim for damages as a right, the principle remains of a general nature that the court of individual rights is the ordinary courts (Article 2 of laca).
Hence it follows that the judge of compensation claims would be, in general, the ordinary courts. This rule
art. 35, paragraphs 1 and 4, would make exceptions (as expressed by the connection), with permission for the administrative court in controversie devolute alla sua giurisdizione esclusiva, possa disporre, anche attraverso la reintegrazione in forma specifica, il risarcimento del danno ingiusto e che nell'esercizio della sua giurisdizione (di legittimità) possa conoscere di tutte le questioni relative all'eventuale risarcimento del danno e agli altri diritti patrimoniali consequenziali.
Non sarebbe stato tuttavia corretto sostenere che si tratti di una concentrazione necessaria, con attrazione inscindibile della tutela risarcitoria al seguito di quella di annullamento, in presenza di un atto amministrativo da impugnare. La concentrazione sarebbe infatti funzionale, in termini di pienezza ed effettività della tutela, alle esigenze del cittadino che chiede giustizia nei confronti della p.a., e pertanto non la si potrebbe ritenere doverosa e tale da dover essere praticata come unica via esclusiva.
Nè, d'altra parte, sarebbe desumibile dal testo normativo - così come interpretato costituzionalmente - che al riconoscimento, in positivo, al giudice amministrativo del potere di disporre il risarcimento del danno ingiusto (comma 1) e di conoscere delle questioni relative all'eventuale risarcimento del danno (comma 4), si unisca, in negativo, la totale sottrazione di eguale potere al giudice ordinario.
Il giudice amministrativo avrebbe potuto conoscere di questioni relative al risarcimento del danno e, cioè, di questioni attinenti ad un diritto soggettivo la cui cognizione è di regola attribuita the ordinary courts, where citizens had exercised the option to request that court for the compensation in conjunction with the cancellation. In this case, as has been observed, the rules concerned made an exception to the court for reasons of connection.
It is still noted that the proposed merger is justified by the type of protection which, in addition to the cancellation, the administrative judge may be given: a "further protection" which is complete with respect to the primary of which requires the successful in that it serves to remove the prejudices that the cancellation could not delete.
E 'due to the dependence additional protection from the annulment of the administrative law judge may consider compensation issues (property rights and other consequential damages) unless he is asked and considering whether to grant the annulment of the prejudices.
regard to the consequences of failure to request annulment of the protection of the limitation period, resulting in inopposability act, it was found that the decay precludes the way of protection for annulment and, consequently, the completion of compensation claims (to be disbursed in particular forms in art. 35, paragraph 2).
It would not be denied the use of only one claim for redress.
It was found, in fact, that in a system where the citizens are recognized both the protection of cancellation, the compensation is (and this dual aspect of the protection of completion that the GA is given as art. 35, paragraph 2, and the second claim for redress the rules of civil law), not necessarily the two forms of protection should be spent on both.
If the victim of unlawful exercise administrative power is not to make use, having no interest, the constitutional protection for annulment of the measure infringes his substantive legal position, but believes, however, consistent with its actual use of interest-only compensation claims , can do so on an autonomous, in the ordinary courts.
It should be free to judge as a preliminary issue of the legality of the act, according to its failure to apply (Article 4, paragraph 1, laca), but will have to assess the measure only as a fact, as a constituent element of the offense. Did not cause a problem referred in the technical sense, as this problem only arose when the first sentence No. 500 of 1999, it was necessary to wait for the cancellation to the damage caused by the sacrifice of interest to legal situations degraded. Once we recognize that the damage of the protected also obliges the PA to pay damages, has failed the interdependence of Recoverability after the annulment of the act.
In cases in which the cancellation had not been asked, could possibly ask a question relating to the merits of the decision, in terms of the compensable amount if the situation falls determined by the measure in did not want to apply for an annulment.
In cases where the cancellation has already been prepared by the same administrative judge (in a period when the administrative court had not jurisdiction of a "full"), following an extraordinary appeal, or office, or if the act is missing, as is the case for delay damages, it could also refer to the claim for redress for the ordinary courts, as l'estensione della cognizione del giudice amministrativo alle questioni relative al risarcimento postula che la relativa tutela sia stata richiesta congiuntamente a quella di annullamento.
17. La sopravvenuta decisione della Corte costituzionale spiana la strada e indirizza la scelta verso la concentrazione della tutela risarcitoria presso il giudice amministrativo, ma lascia impregiudicato il punto del trattamento processuale della tutela risarcitoria.
18. - Le Sezioni unite - nell'esercizio della funzione di riparto della giurisdizione (artt. 31, 41 c.p.c., art. 360 c.p.c., n. 1, art. 362 c.p.c.; L. 11 marzo 1953, n. 87, art. 37, comma 2) ad esse attribuito dal nuovo codice di rito (dopo la soppressione del Tribunale dei conflitti, established by L. March 31, 1877, No 3761, cd. L. Mancini-Peruzzi) - see a need to access a solution, which, while taking account of the constitutional principles that bind the legal protection offered by two orders of Judges to the subjective situations, in the light of the criterion laid down in Article. 103 of the Constitution, adopts the values \u200b\u200bof effectiveness and concentration of the protections that underlie art. 111 of the Constitution - and in particular the principle of reasonable duration of trials - that the Constitutional Court has taken as the guiding principle of interpretation of other rules of justice.
19. In this context, it should be noted that adequate protection against damages to the legitimate government this Court is not received by extending that protection to the legitimate interests of individual rights - but saying that, in terms of compensation claims, one can not differentiate between interests that are securable into and through the security interests that are ' intermediary of the administrative power.
This change - which deletes a substantive standpoint, with regard to compensation claims, the gap between rights and interests otherwise relevant - ages in a historical moment in which the legislature has taken the road that led him to set up the administrative jurisdiction of the court as jurisdiction requires a full and, therefore, be given a more coherent lettura al sistema del riparto di giurisdizioni, in particolare una lettura che leghi la potestas iudicandi alla natura della situazione soggettiva.
La tesi "tutta civilistica" non può essere condivisa allorchè disattende la svolta voluta dal legislatore di assicurare all'interesse legittimo una tutela piena, concentrata dinanzi a un unico giudice per il principio di effettività che reca in sè la ragionevolezza dei tempi di tutela.
La soluzione, fatta propria dal legislatore del 2000 e in linea con la portata di "norma di sistema" riconosciuta dalla Corte costituzionale all'art. 24 Cost. con la sentenza 204 del 2004, da ultimo ribadita, è coerente con la riaffermazione del criterio tradizionale del riparto fondato non sulla distinzione tra le tecniche di tutela, bensì sulla natura sostanziale delle situazioni soggettive. D'altra parte, questa ricostruzione è coerente anche con il processo di evoluzione che caratterizza l'interesse legittimo, che va perdendo la sua tradizionale funzione meramente famulativa o ancillare rispetto all'interesse pubblico, per assumere un più marcato connotato sostanziale, coerentemente del resto con l'evoluzione della stessa nozione di interesse pubblico, al cui perseguimento si accompagna un aumento della discrezionalità, ma anche della connessa responsabilità dell'amministrazione.
Deriva da ciò che - in linea di principio e salvo quanto si è già considerato - la giurisdizione sulla tutela the legitimate interest can only accrue to the administrative court, both in the technical protection of cancellation, in the techniques of compensation claims, specific performance or a similar technique that can not be the subject of separate and distinct account in the jurisdiction.
20. Similarly, the solution can not be shared cd.
"administrative", where, on the one hand, poses an inseparable, not required by law nor by the constitutional framework, including protection for annulment and compensation claims (Ad. Plen. No. 4 of 2003), on the other seems to cover administrative jurisdiction in any context characterized by the presence of the civil service without requiring that this function has been a real exercise in traditional ways and forms of administrative power, which only allow you to recognize the act as an expression of existing power.
From the first point of view is not irrelevant to consider that the preliminary decision of administrative theory, understood as the dependence of the right to compensation from the prior cancellation, was acquired in a context in which one side was excluded from the Recoverability of injury suffered the sacrifice of situations of legitimate interest, the other was approved for the treatment of this situation, that degraded the individual right to interest.
Nor is it irrelevant to consider that the limitation period in awe is provided by law for the action for annulment, and in this system, the incidental finding of illegality is denied not only to exclude that defects before they can be detected after giving rise to the annulment of measures that require the non-contested but also because the effects of the action for annulment shall not be exhausted in the relationship between the administration and the injured party and, quite often, are refracted on to others in conflict with one who has sought the annulment.
But, when this is not the annulment of the act is alleged, but the question of the illegality of the situation with the adoption and execution, an assertion that runs out of its relevance nel rapporto tra soggetto leso e pubblica amministrazione.
Queste considerazioni, unitamente ai ricordati processi di cambiamento che caratterizzano l'interesse legittimo e la sua relazione con l'interesse pubblico, giustificano ampiamente l'abbandono di un approccio di tipo tradizionale. Ammettere la necessaria dipendenza del risarcimento dal previo annullamento dell'atto illegittimo e dannoso, anzichè dal solo accertamento della sua illegittimità significherebbe restringere la tutela che spetta al privato di fronte alla pubblica amministrazione ed assoggettare il suo diritto al risarcimento del danno, anzichè alla regola generale della prescrizione, ad una Verwirkung amministrativa, tutta italiana.
La conclusione da accogliere è dunque che, dopo l'irruzione nel mondo del diritto della risarcibilità - effettiva e non solo dichiarata - anche dell'interesse legittimo, e dopo i ricordati tentativi dei primi anni novanta della doppia tutela (espressamente abrogata sia dal D.Lgs. n. 80 del 1998, art. 35 sia " dalla L. n. 205 del 2000, art. 7, lett. c)), il legislatore di fine secolo non ha inteso ridurre la tutela risarcitoria al solo profilo di completamento di quella demolitaria, ma, mentre l'ha riconosciuta con i caratteri propri del diritto al risarcimento del danno, ha ritenuto di affidare la corrispondente tutela giudiziaria al giudice amministrativo, nell'intento di rendere il conseguimento di tale tutela più agevole per il cittadino.
21. In definitiva, we can say that both points of view on display ("all civil" and "all amministrativistica") can lead to a decrease of effective public protection, in violation of the principles under Article. 24 of the Constitution. That
legal, because eventually fragment or multiply locations and timing of judicial review, moreover, by a straight line leading away from the rule of apportionment. That
amministrativistica because they may provide protection to the legitimate interest that compresses the scope of compensation claims by reducing, for the manner or content, scope.
It also, according to some reports already play, ends by extending the area of \u200b\u200badministrative jurisdiction beyond the concrete in connection with the exercise of public power.
In such a situation, the observation that the legislature of 2000 has rightly concentrated forms of protection of the legitimate in one court must be accompanied by an awareness of the continuing validity of L. March 20, 1865, Art. 2 and 4 all. And that still constitute a public protection ordinary jurisdiction as a garrison for all subjects in which you face-issue "of a civil or political rights."
Our system is based precisely on Article. 2907 cc, which is matched by the art. 99 Code, and is a system civil law, in which the recognition of the subjective position to be protected, crystallized by the constitutional recognition (Articles 24 and 113 of the Constitution), before the courts.
In such a system, the l. of 1865, Art. 2 - according to a reading consistent with the provisions of Title 4 of the Constitution ^ - is ultimately a standard locking system, which gives the ordinary courts the power and duty to ensure the full protection when other values \u200b\u200bof equally important constitutional does not make legitimate the use of different models of protection.
22. How many times both in the presence of acts related to public administration as well as in subjects treated with it in order to protect giudiziaria del destinatario del provvedimento e l'atto sia capace di esplicare i propri effetti perchè il potere non incontra ostacolo in diritti incomprimibili della persona, la tutela giudiziaria deve dunque essere chiesta al giudice amministrativo.
Gli potrà essere chiesta la tutela demolitoria e, insieme o successivamente, la tutela risarcitoria completiva.
Ma la parte potrà chiedere al giudice amministrativo anche solo la tutela risarcitoria, senza dover osservare allora il termine di decadenza pertinente all'azione di annullamento.
23. A proposito di questo secondo enunciato, merita da un lato soffermarsi qui sulle considerazioni, già svolte, che hanno condotto a questa interpretazione delle norme attributive della giurisdizione e dall'altro renderne esplicite le conseguente.
Si è notato che, in rapporto alla tutela risarcitoria, è venuta meno sul piano del diritto sostanziale la differenza tra le situazioni che nell'ordinamento trovano protezione.
L'evoluzione dell'ordinamento ha cioè condotto ad omologare gli interessi legittimi ai diritti quanto al bagaglio delle tutele:
com'era stato per le situazioni di diritto soggettivo, di norma dotate, oltre che di tutela risarcitoria, anche di una tutela ripristinatoria, completata dal diritto al risarcimento del danno, così per gli interessi legittimi una tutela risarcitoria autonoma è stata affiancata alla tutela reale di annullamento, only in situations of legitimate interest were first provided, and the protection of cancellation has also been shaped so as to include damages, which the cancellation can not elide.
If the plane of the forms of protection that you are moving to the apportionment of the function of judicial protection of rights and interests against the public administration, interpretation of the rules are constitutionally attributed to the administrative court jurisdiction over compensation damage, allows them to recognize the scope of the administrative courts have jurisdiction also given only in relation to compensation claims independently.
But this is because, in the balance between values \u200b\u200bof significance at the constitutional level, is to recognize the legality of a provision that while the focus judicial protection at the administrative court, is without prejudice to the substantive protection of subjective situations sacrificed the government from acting unlawfully.
On the other hand, this is the only interpretation that can make working together, the subjective situations where we are now dealing, the value of full jurisdiction and that of a substantive protection of legitimate interests not dissimilar from any other situation protected in relation to compensation claims. So that it follows from the premise so necessary so that the administrative judge can not, at this legislation, if not to exercise jurisdiction, the rules attribute to him as to the independent claim for redress, regardless of their own rules of jurisdiction for annulment.
It can be argued, is that the availability of the legislature to regulate the protection of subjective situations by imposing a limitation of the exercise.
However, a provision which is lacking today and that explicitly subject to a limitation period only the question of damages before the administrative judge would not be formulated so as to make the term substantially equal to that which is subject to the application cancellation, as this applies to place different problem of the legitimacy of a regime to come back to deny the claim for redress for situations subjective self-sacrifice from the illegitimate power of government.
remains to explain another aspect that is inherent in the necessary way to having said that the L. July 21, 2000, No 205, Art. 7 gave the court jurisdiction over the administration of autonomous demand compensation.
independent claim for redress situations of legitimate interest means protection due to the fact that the situation for the subjects were sacrificed by a power exercised in an unlawful manner and the question with which this protection is sought requires the court to establish the illegality of that act.
This finding can not therefore be precluded from inopposability the measure nor the right to compensation can be disregarded for themselves instead of what helps to determine the damage, ie the setting that the report was based on the measure and that the government maintained despite its illegality.
The refusal of compensation claims self-motivated, the issues below, will prove to be questionable by the appeal on grounds of jurisdiction.
The administrative court has in fact refused to exercise a jurisdiction which belongs to him.
24. At the end of this long digression, the legal principles enunciated by these joint sections are as follows:
1) the jurisdiction of administrative courts exist in the presence of a specific exercise of power conferred by this according to the procedure being performed and the forms adopted, in consonance with the rules that govern;
2) administrative court to have the various forms of protection that the law ready for sacrifice from the subjective circumstances of illegitimate power and protection falls between these forms of compensation damage;
3) The administrative judge refused to exercise jurisdiction and its decision under Article. Cpc 362, subsection 1, is suitable a cassazione da parte delle sezioni (unite quale giudice del riparto della giurisdizione, se l'esame del merito della domanda autonoma di risarcimento del danno è rifiutato per la ragione che nel termine per ciò stabilito non sono stati chiesti l'annullamento dell'atto e la conseguente rimozione dei suoi effetti.
25. Va affermata, invece, la giurisdizione ordinaria sulla controversia promossa nei confronti del prof. F.E..
Ai fini della risoluzione del problema processuale non rileva stabilire se il F. abbia agito quale organo dell'Università, ovvero, a causa del perseguimento di finalità private, si sia verificata la cd. "frattura" del rapporto organico. Nell'uno, come nell'altro caso, l'azione risarcitoria is brought against the officer on his own, and, therefore, in respect of a private entity, distinct from the administration, with which, as may be jointly and severally obliged (Article 28 of the Constitution).
The question of jurisdiction, in fact, which excludes the others mentioned above, it should be resolved solely on the basis of Article. 103 of the Constitution, not to suggest that the administrative judge may hear and determine disputes unless it is part of a government or entities treated as such.
26. In this regard, the jurisprudence of the sections together is expressed uniquely in considering essential, because it can be envisaged membership of the dispute to court amministrativa, che sia proposte nei confronti di soggetti titolari di poteri amministrativi (Cass. S.U. 22494/2004, 2560/2005, 7800/2005). Il principio ha trovato specifica applicazione per il caso di pretesa risarcitoria avanzata nei confronti del funzionario cui era imputata l'adozione di provvedimento illegittimo (Cass. S.U. 3357/1992) ed ulteriormente precisato nel senso che la controversia va devoluta alla giurisdizione del giudice ordinario in quanto fondata sulla deduzione di un fatto illecito extracontrattuale e intercorrente tra privati, non ostando a ciò la proposizione della domanda anche nei confronti dell'ente pubblico sotto il profilo della responsabilità solidale dello stesso, attenendo al merito l'effettiva riferibilità all'ente dei comportamenti dei funzionari (Cass. S.u. 4591/2006).
Va aggiunto che, in linea generale, la giurisdizione è inderogabile per ragioni di connessione (salva diversa, specifica, previsione normativa) e che il coordinamento tra le giurisdizioni su rapporti diversi ma interdipendenti può trovare soluzione secondo le regole della sospensione del procedimento pregiudicato (Cass. S.U. 3508/2003).
27. Conclusivamente, va dichiarata la giurisdizione del giudice amministrativo in relazione alla domanda di risarcimento del danno proposta nei confronti dell'Università degli studi di Pisa; la giurisdizione ordinaria per la domanda proposta contro il prof. F.E..
Sussistono, evidenti, giusti motivi per offset the costs of the proceedings between the applicant and the F., and nothing is provided for costs against the University, who has not played defense activities in this review.
PQM
The Court, in sections joined together, declares the jurisdiction of the administrative courts on the claim against the University of Pisa declares the jurisdiction of ordinary courts on the claim against FE; compensation expenses of opinion between the C. and F..
Decided in Rome, in the Council Chamber of the United Civil Sections, November 24, 2005.
deposited at the Registry June 13, 2006
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